Publication Date: 6/1/74
    Pages: 12
    Date Entered: 2/22/84
    Title: SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DOORWAY MONITORS
    June 1974
    U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
    REGULATORY GUIDE
    DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
    REGULATORY GUIDE 5.27
    SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DOORWAY MONITORS
A. INTRODUCTION
    Paragraph (b), "Exit Requirement," of Section 73.60, "Additional
    Requirements for the Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material at
    Fixed Sites," of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and
    Materials," requires that individuals exiting from material access areas
    be searched for concealed special nuclear material (SNM). This guide
    describes means acceptable to the Regulatory staff for employing SNM
    doorway monitors to comply with that requirement.
B. DISCUSSION
    Special nuclear material doorway monitors provide an efficient,
    sensitive, and reasonably unobtrusive means of searching individuals
    exiting from a material access area for concealed SNM. With proper
    installation and operation, gram quantities or less of SNM can be
    detected with a high level of reliability while maintaining a low false
    alarm rate.
1. Theory of Operation
    The doorway monitor is composed of a detector unit(s), associated
    electronics, and alarm logic. The detector unit(s) is sensitive to the
    radiations which emanate from the SNM and responds to these radiations
    (usually gamma rays) by generating current pulses. These pulses are
    amplified, filtered, and fed to alarm logic which interprets the number
    (or rate) of pulses in some period of time, for example, one second.
    The alarm logic may be either a digital or analog system; in either
    case, if the number (or rate) of pulses exceeds a set level, an alarm
    condition ensues.
2. General Characteristics
    Typically, the detectors of a doorway monitor are NaI(T1)
    scintillators or solid or liquid organic scintillators. Geiger-Mueller
    detectors have also been used in this application, although the lower
    intrinsic efficiency of these detectors renders them less suitable than
    scintillation detectors.
    Detectors are arranged such that a detection area is defined by a
    plane perpendicular to the line of passage of individuals through the
    doorway monitor. Various arrangements of the detectors are possible;
    however, specific placement of detectors is usually dictated by the need
    to eliminate dead spots.
    Some commercially available doorway monitors are equipped with an
    automatic background updating system. The automatic background updating
    system periodically monitors and averages the background. A doorway
    monitor equipped with an automatic background updating system is also
    provided with a treadle pad or beam-break system to indicate that the
    sensitive area is occupied. When the sensitive area is occupied, the
    radiation level detected by the doorway monitor is compared with the
    mean background. If the level is "significantly" greater than the mean
    background, an alarm condition ensues. Significance is usually
    determined by comparing the radiation level when the sensitive area is
    occupied with the mean background plus some multiple of the square root
    of the mean background(*)----------
    (*) The square root of the mean of a Poisson-distributed quantity
    is the unbiased estimate of the standard deviation of that quantity.
    ----------
    Thus the condition for an alarm can be written as
    G > B + n Square Root B,
    where B is the mean background, G is the radiation level with the
    sensitive area occupied, and n is a multiplier, usually an integer
    between 4 and 10.(*) The value of n directly affects the false alarm
    rate, and the combination of B and n affect the sensitivity.
    Although the automatic background updating system allows
    unattended use of the doorway monitor, for technical reasons, the system
    may be less effective in certain situations. Techniques to prevent this
    are described in the Regulatory Position.
    Doorway monitors not equipped with an automatic background
    updating system either must rely on the inherent sensitivity of the
    instrument and low background variation to ensure that concealed SNM
    will be detected or must be attended so that a measurement of background
    can be taken immediately prior to use and the alarm level set to
    maintain the desired sensitivity to concealed SNM. As with the doorway
    monitor equipped with an automatic background updating system, a doorway
    monitor not so equipped compares the activity with the detection area
    occupied with some set value, usually the measurement of background
    taken just prior to use. In any case, the expression above can be used
    as a condition of alarm by replacing B + n Square Root B with the set
    level.
    Whether or not a doorway monitor is equipped with an automatic
    background updating system, high background activity will decrease
    sensitivity. Measuring activity for longer periods will somewhat
    compensate for high background; however, longer measurement periods will
    make use of the doorway monitor less convenient.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
1. Minimum Qualifications for SNM Doorway Monitors
    a. General
    (1) SNM Doorway monitors should be used in conjunction
    with a metal detector and should be installed in a passageway (see
    Regulatory Guide 5.7, "Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas,
    Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas,") in such a manner that objects
    cannot be passed over, around, or under the detection area.
    ----------
    (*) Note that, in general, for a count rate system, the condition
    for alarm should be modified to account for the response time of the
    instrument as follows:
    G > B + n Square Root B(1 - e(-t/tau))k
    where t is the counting time and tau is the time constant of the
    instrument. If, as should be the case, t/tau > 5 the added factor is
    essentially unity.
    ----------
    (2) The detector elements should be designed and
    positioned so that detection sensitivity is as uniform as possible over
    the detection area; in no case should any areas where SNM is not
    detectible be permitted.
    (3) Power, sensitivity, and other controls of the doorway
    monitor should be tamper-safed when unattended.
    (4) Signal lines connecting alarm relays to the alarm
    monitor should be supervised.
    (5) Some doorway monitors may require an individual to
    occupy the detection area for a specified time, longer than a normal
    walking pace would provide. If this is the case, the doorway monitor
    should be provided with a treadle pad and a "clock" device to assure
    that the detection area is occupied for the requisite time. An aural
    and visual indication should be given if an individual being searched
    does not occupy the area sufficiently long.
    b. System Specification
    (1) Plutonium-239. A doorway monitor used to detect
    plutonium should be capable of detecting a minimum of 0.5 gram of
    plutonium-239 encased in a minimum of 3 mm of brass at a 90% confidence
    limit. The false alarm rate should be less than 0.1% (Appendix C).
    (2) Uranium-233. A doorway monitor used to detect
    uranium-233 should be capable of detecting within 4 hours of
    purification(*) a minimum of 1 gram of uranium-233 containing between 7
    and 10 ppm of uranium-232 encased in a minimum of 3 mm of brass at a 90%
    confidence limit. The false alarm rate should be less than 0.1%
    (Appendix C).
    (3) Uranium-235. A doorway monitor used to detect
    uranium-235 should be capable of detecting a minimum of 3 grams of
    uranium-235 contained in uranium enriched to 20% or more in the
    uranium-235 isotope encased in a minimum of 3 mm of brass at a 50%
    confidence limit. The false alarm rate should be less than 0.1%
    (Appendix C).
2. Use of Doorway Monitors
    In general, doorway monitors should be used in locations of
    minimum background and minimum background fluctation. If circumstances
    dictate use of a doorway monitor in an area of high background,
    sufficient shielding should be provided to maintain necessary
    sensitivity.
    a. Attended Doorway Monitor
    (1) If the doorway monitor is attended during use, it need
    not be equipped with an automatic background updating system, although
    such capability is preferred.
    ----------
    (*) Purification means removal of all decay products.
    ----------
    (2) Prior to each use(*) of a doorway monitor not equipped
    with an automatic background updating system, a measurement of
    background should be taken, and the alarm threshold should be set to the
    proper value listed in Table I for the measured background and the
    proper n value as determined in Appendix B. Each individual to be
    checked should, in turn, enter the detection area and be required to
    remain sufficiently long for the device to operate properly. During
    use, the background should be checked and the alarm threshold reset at
    least each 15 minutes.
    (3) With the individual being checked in the detection
    area, an alarm should sound if the activity in the detection area
    exceeds the alarm threshold T, as such a situation would indicate the
    presence of SNM.
    (4) The doorway monitor should be equipped with a
    high-background alarm which will sound if the measurement of background
    exceeds the appropriate maximum permissible background level listed in
    Table II as determined in Appendix C. The doorway monitor should not be
    used during such periods of high background.
    b. Unattended Doorway Monitor
    (1) If the doorway monitor is unattended, an automatic
    background update system should be incorporated into the doorway monitor
    electronics and alarm logic. The control circuitry, if possible, should
    be located at the central alarm station (or other monitoring point).
    (2) Door interlocks and closed-circuit TV in combination
    with beam breaks, motion detectors, and/ or treadle pads, should be
    employed to:
    (a) Indicate to the person manning the central alarm
    station that an individual has entered the secure access passageway
    and/or is approaching the doorway monitor,
    (b) Allow observation of the individual approaching
    the doorway monitor,
    (c) Preclude a slow approach to the sensitive area
    of the doorway monitor, and
    ----------
    (*) By use is meant an individual or several individuals, each, in
    turn, being checked for SNM by the doorway monitor. The maximum period
    between threshold sets while the doorway monitor is in use is determined
    by the stability of local background and may necessarily be more
    frequent than every 15 minutes.
    ----------
    (d) Activate the electronics and alarm logic when an
    individual is within the detection area and initiate operation of the
    doorway monitor.
    (3) An alarm should sound in the central alarm station if,
    when occupied, the activity in the detection area exceeds the internally
    set threshold level (the mean background plus some multiple times the
    square root of the mean background), as such a situation would indicate
    the presence of SNM upon the individual being checked.
    (4) The doorway monitor should be equipped with a
    high-background alarm which will sound if the average background at the
    location of the doorway monitor exceeds the appropriate maximum
    permissible background level listed in Table II as determined in
    Appendix C. The doorway monitor should not be used during such periods
    of high background. Other monitored exits should be used.
3. Testing and Calibration
    a. Testing
    Doorway monitors should be tested by passing an appropriate
    source of the amount and isotope specified in Regulatory Position C.1.b.
    through the doorway monitor no less frequently than once per day.(*) In
    addition, a functional performance test should be carried out at least
    once per week. An acceptable functional performance test procedure is
    discussed in Appendix A of this guide
    b. Calibration
    Doorway monitors should be calibrated with a source of the
    amount, configuration, and variety of SNM to be detected (e.g., 0.5 gram
    Pu in 3 mm of brass). Calibration should be carried out according to a
    procedure such as that in Appendix B.
    c. Operating Instructions
    Operating instructions should be posted near the doorway monitor,
    if attended, or at the monitoring point if the doorway monitor is
    unattended. The instructions should clearly indicate the procedure for
    use of the doorway monitor and the procedure for setting thresholds, if
    appropriate. In addition, the operating instructions should indicate
    what corrective action is to be taken and who is to be notified in the
    event of a malfunction.
    ----------
    (*) Doorway monitors used to search for concealed U-233 should be
    tested according to Section 6 of Appendix A.
    ----------
    (Due to database constraints, Tables I and II are not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)APPENDIX A
    PROCEDURE FOR TESTING SNM DOORWAY MONITORS FOR FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE
    Doorway monitors should be tested by employing a test source of the same
    isotope of SNM the doorway monitor is used to detect as follows:
1. With the detection area unoccupied, measure and record background.
2. Determine alarm threshold T from Table I (see Appendix B).
3. Place a test source in the detection area of the doorway monitor.
    The test source should be such that the activity in the detection area
    slightly exceeds the T level.(*) The doorway monitor should go into an
    alarm condition if operating properly.
4. Remove test source to its original location and measure background
    once again. If the measurement of background taken immediately after
    the test varies by more than 2 Square Root B from the background taken
    before the test, the test should be repeated, for such a difference
    indicates nonrandom fluctuations of the background or equipment
    malfunction. The probability of such an occurrence due to the
    randomness of the background is less than 8%.
    ----------
    (*) The test source may be improvised by partially shielding the
    calibration source.
    ----------
5. A calibration source (Appendix B) should be carried repeatedly to
    various places within the detection area of the doorway monitor in
    simulation of actual use to verify that the SNM can be detected
    everywhere within the detection area and to assure proper operation of
    treadle pads, beam-break, or similar devices if the doorway monitor is
    so equipped.
6. Doorway monitors used to search for concealed uranium-233 should
    be tested with each uranium purification run, but no more frequently
    than daily. The test source should be freshly purified uranium-233
    (within four hours of removal of decay products).
    APPENDIX B
    PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE BACKGROUND
    Background should be measured over several workshifts to determine
    the setpoints for alarm threshold (with or without automatic background
    updating) to assure that normal operation will be minimally affected by
    alarms due to high background.
    The doorway monitor should be calibrated with the amount of the
    appropriate isotope specified in Regulatory Positions C.1.b(1), (2), or
    (3) of this guide (e.g., 0.5 gram plutonium-239 in 3 mm of brass).
    The calibration procedure described below is essentially a means
    of determining maximum permissible background for effective operation of
    the doorway monitor.
1. Place a calibration source variously about the detection area and
    take readings to determine the least sensitive point. This location of
    minimum sensitivity should be maintained as the calibration point.
2. Measure background over several workshifts to determine the
    periods of high background and the range of background. A minimum of 20
    measurements should be taken. The variance of the background is given
    by
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)where N is the number of measurements, B is the mean of the background
    measurements, and B(i) is the i(th) background measurement.
3. With the calibration source at the calibration point, the mean
    gross counts G should be determined during a period of high background
    to establish the upper operating range of the doorway monitor. Table II
    lists various maximum permissible background levels for a given value of
    G for values of the parameters n and alpha. During periods when the
    background exceeds the value found from Table II, the sensitivity of the
    doorway monitor will generally be below that specified as minimum in
    Regulatory Position C.1.b of this guide.
    The parameter n is a function of the background variation and the
    permissible false alarm rate and is calculated from
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.) Generally, n is taken as an integer. If n satisfies the above
    expression, the expected false alarm rate (Appendix C) due to background
    fluctuations should be less than 0.1%. Larger values of n will decrease
    the expected false alarm rate; however, the maximum allowable background
    for a given G will also decrease.
4. For doorway monitors equipped with automatic background updating
    systems, the alarm threshold is
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)where n should be derived from expression (2), and the instrument set
    accordingly.
5. The high-background alarm should be set at the B value given in
    Table II for the measured G and calculated n values.
6. For doorway monitors not equipped with an automatic background
    update, the value of n determined above should be employed in the use of
    the doorway monitor according to Regulatory Position C.2.a.
    ----------
    (*) The false alarm rate is estimated by the probability that an
    observation of a quantity distributed normally about some value X will
    exceed X by n (Std. deviation of X). The factor 3.1 limits the false
    alarm rate to 0.1%, while the factor (Var B/B)(1/2) compensates for
    observed deviations in the background distribution from Poisson.
    ----------
    APPENDIX C
    DETECTION CONFIDENCE LIMITS, THRESHOLDS, AND MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE
    BACKGROUND
    With a calibration source at the calibration point, the condition
    for an alarm is, in general,
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)where g is a single measurement of G (the mean radiation level with the
    source), B is the mean background, and m is some multiplier. The
    detection confidence limit is the probability that with the calibration
    source at the calibration point, any single determination of G will
    exceed a threshold T, i.e., the above inequality will be satisfied. For
    any given probability P(alpha), there exists a value alpha such that
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)with a probability of P(alpha), where g is any single measurement of the
    quantity G. Hence the condition for a detection confidence limit of
    P(alpha) is
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)For a given value of G, solving (3) gives the maximum permissible B at
    which the doorway monitor will detect the source with a confidence
    Palpha. For P(alpha) = 90%, alpha = 1.3, and for P(alpha) = 50%, alpha
    = 0.
    The condition for a false alarm(*) is written as
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)where b is a single measurement without the source and beta is a number
    corresponding to a false alarm probability P(beta). For P(beta) = 0.1%,
    beta = 3.1. Hence the necessary condition for maintaining a false alarm
    rate below P(beta) is
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)However, the doorway monitor actually compares b with B + n Square Root
    B, hence the condition on n becomes
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.)or
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.) In Table I threshold values of T were determined by substituting
    equation (6) into equation (3):
    (Due to database constraints, this equation is not included. Please
    contact LIS to obtain a copy.) The values of B in Table II were then calculated for alpha = 1.3
    and alpha = 0 from equation (3) assuming that, for the determination of
    G, the background should be reasonably stable and therefore Sqare Root
    Var G ~ Square Root G.
    ----------
    (*) False alarm means an alarm condition generated by statistical
    fluctuations in the background radiation or by instabilities of the
    electronics which appear as background fluctuations when the detection
    area is occupied.
    ----------
    21